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The performance of Water Communities (WCs), a form of self-managing organisation for 
irrigation, in the Bregalnica region of the Republic of Macedonia is investigated. Analysis, 
drawing on primary survey data, focuses on the decision of farmers to join a WC (Heckman 
selection probit model), determinants of farmers’ satisfaction with their membership of WCs 
(ordered  probit  model)  and  factors  associated  with  changes  in  farmers’  water  payment 
behaviour (non-parametric CLAD model). Key determinants identified include transparency 
and trust with respect to the structure and operation of the WC, cost recovery rates, farm size 
and  irrigation  costs.  Membership  satisfaction  is  an  important  determinant  of  payment 
behaviour. Lessons for sustainable self-management are drawn. 
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In both developed and less developed countries there has been a broad shift in policy away 
from state based irrigation management towards supporting the development of private and 
independent,  not-for-profit  arrangements,  particularly  local  Water  User  Associations 
(WUAs).  This  movement,  which  is  often  referred  to  as  irrigation  management  transfer 
(Yercan et al., 2004), has been promoted by nation states and international agencies such as 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the World Bank. While WUAs are 
widely seen to have the potential to be a superior institutional arrangement for local irrigation 
management,  delivering  meaningful  benefits  to  farmers  and  taxpayers,  it  is  nonetheless 
recognised that the performance of WUAs in practice has been patchy (Meinzen-Dick et al. 
1997;  Yercan,  2003).  There  is  therefore  a  need  to  carefully  evaluate  the  performance  of 
WUAs and understand the principles that underpin successful self-government.  
This  paper  seeks  to  contribute  to  this  debate  by  evaluating  the  success  of  the 
introduction of Water Communities (WCs) in the Republic of Macedonia. Macedonia is a 
Balkan  state  where  agriculture  is  the  mainstay  of  rural  livelihoods  and  substantial  water 
deficiencies occur during the summer season, so that irrigation has a major impact on yields 
and hence incomes (Taseva, 2000). By comparing performance across several WCs, which 
are a form of WUA that were created within a common external environment and institutional 
framework, it is possible to identify internal principles and qualities that are critical to success 
and  determine  variations  in  outcomes.  The  identification  of  factors  that  underpin  self-
sustaining WUAs, is particularly pertinent for states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE),   3 
that have undergone a transition from central planning to more market based economies. This 
transition  in  agriculture  was  characterised  by  substantial  falls  in  agricultural  output  and 
decapitalisation (Macours and Swinnen, 2002). Much state owned irrigation fell into disrepair 
and the establishment of local self-governance  for economically  sustainable irrigation has 
been seen widely as an essential task (Zhovtonog et al. 2005), although some have doubted 
whether this can be currently achieved in the Balkans (Theesfeld, 2004). Through the analysis 
of the performance of WCs in Macedonia we seek to contribute to these wider debates on 
factors  underpinning  successful  self-management  and  opportunities  for  local  irrigation 
management in CEE. 
2. Determinants of the Success of Self-Managing Organisations 
WUAs can be defined as not for profit organizations that are initiated, and managed by a 
group of water users along one or more hydrological sub-systems (IWMI, 2003). Farmers that 
agree to become members of the WUA, pool resources for the operation and maintenance of 
the irrigation and drainage system within their jurisdiction. The theoretical justification of 
WUAs and their advantages over both state led or uncoordinated activity by individuals is 
based  on  the  common  pool  resource  management  literature,  particularly  the  writings  of 
Ostrom (1990, 1992). Irrigation is conceptualised as a common pool resource in that there is 
an  asset  to  be  managed  (physical  infrastructure)  and  a  stream  of  benefits  (distribution  of 
water) that require group management because it is typically difficult to restrict access to 
individual members (non-excludability) but the use of a particular amount of water by one 
user  depletes  the  resources  available  to  others  (rivalrous  consumption)  (Bromley,  1992; 
Ostrom,  1990).  The  difficulty  of  exclusion  increases  individual  incentives  to  free  ride, 
consequently depleting the common resource, leading to a ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 
1968). To protect common pool resources, state control has often been adopted but in practice 
many state-managed irrigation systems have performed poorly. In particular, state financed   4 
and managed technological solutions in irrigation have often failed at the local level due to 
ineffective monitoring and enforcement of rules (Vandersypen et al. 2006). 
Ostrom  (1990,  1992)  argues  that  state  ownership  may  not  be  necessary  or  even 
preferable  for  the  management  of  common  pool  resources.  Rather  self-management  may 
successfully  develop  for  common  pool  resources.  In  the  case  of  irrigation,  self-managed 
WUAs may improve farmer welfare in a number of regards. Firstly, water delivery services 
may improve because local farmers have stronger incentives to distribute the water effectively 
and better information about irrigation needs than external state agencies (Meinzen-Dick et al. 
1997). This should reduce costs. Secondly, system maintenance may improve under WUA 
arrangements as farmer members are more likely to care for irrigation systems if the WUAs 
must  bear  the  costs  of  repairs  (Merrey  and  Murray-Rust,  1991).  As  the  care  and  use  of 
irrigation  systems  improves,  so  agricultural  productivity,  and  hence  incomes,  should  rise 
(Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997). Finally, some have argued that local systems will be better able 
to control and prevent opportunistic behaviour, increasing fee-collection and improving the 
financial viability of irrigation systems (Yercan et al. 2004). Such an outcome would reduce 
dependence on state funds.  
The  performance  of  WUAs  has  previously  been  measured  in  three  ways: 
membership rates, technical impact and cost recovery. Technical impact has been assessed in 
terms  of  changes  in  yields,  water  availability  and  area  irrigated.  Such  assessments  are 
typically based on expert opinion with little recourse to the views of ordinary members. Yet 
the  sustainability  of  WUAs  will  depend  ultimately  on  the  satisfaction  and  retained 
membership  of  farmers.  Moreover,  previous  assessments  have  tended  to  be  based  on 
comparisons  of  WUAs  from  different  countries  and  market  environments  so  it  has  been 
difficult to identify the relative importance of external factors compared to member / resource 
characteristics  in  influencing  performance.  Our  analysis  recognises  these  difficulties  and   5 
compares  the  performance  of  WUAs  created  in  the  Bregalnica  region  of  the  Republic  of 
Macedonia under a common legal framework and time period. This allows for a comparison 
of cases with a similar external environment and therefore a clearer understanding of the role 
of internal  (to the WUA, farm and farmer) factors. Performance is measured in terms of 
propensity to become a member, member satisfaction and farmers’ payment rates (% of billed 
amounts that are paid).  
Even  when  self-organisation  may  be  the  preferable  governance  mechanism, 
sustainable WUAs may not always emerge (Baland and Platteau, 1996). Recognising this, 
Ostrom (1990), attempts to identify factors that are associated with positive outcomes. She 
concludes  that,  based  on  case  study  evidence,  successful  self-managing  institutions  are 
characterised by: clearly defined boundaries, congruence between the distribution of benefits 
and costs of provision rules, democratic decision making, effective monitoring,  graduated 
sanctions to punish those who violate operational rules, mechanisms to resolve conflicts, and 
external recognition of the right to organise. The ability of a particular institution to meet 
these requirements, according to Ostrom (1992), depends on both internal characteristics and 
the external environment (Table 1). The main external factors identified by Ostrom (1992) as 
conducive  to  successful  WUAs  are  effective  legal  rights  to  organise  and  negotiate  and 
established property rights and markets for crops. As the WCs in Macedonia were created 
under  a  common  legal  framework  and  support  programme,  and  thus  a  shared  external 
environment,  we  concentrate  on  internal  factors  which  are  split  into  four  sub-categories: 
socio-economic characteristics, structure and conduct of the WUA, irrigation technology and 
costs (Table 1). It is expected that these factors influence the probability of successful self-
management and provide the basis for testing hypotheses in Section 5.  
 
Socio-economic factors   6 
Irrigation will be most valued in environments of moderate water scarcity. Where water is 
plentiful the pressure for self-organisation of irrigation facilities is minimal and at the other 
extreme  if  the  scarcity  of  water  is  so  severe  that  even  self-organisation  cannot  solve  the 
problem, co-operation is unlikely. In cases of moderate water scarcity the impact of irrigation 
is  likely  to  be  greatest,  presenting  attractive  potential  returns  from  self-organisation.  The 
impact  of  irrigation  will  also  be  greater  where  farmers  produce  crops  that  consume 
considerable water and are sensitive to moisture stress (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997). Marshall 
(2004) therefore asserts that where irrigation is more critical for their livelihood, farmers have 
greater  incentives  to  co-operate  to  ensure  a  functioning  irrigation  system.  While  little 
empirical research has been conducted, it is also expected that farmers with larger farms and 
who are younger and better educated are more likely to appreciate the benefits of WUAs, and 
thus become a member and value the benefits.  
 
Structure and conduct of the WUA 
The size of the group (both in terms of geographical area and number of potential members) 
will influence the degree of congruence between costs and benefits and the ease of monitoring 
/ imposition of sanctions. Due to the large fixed costs connected with irrigation, the average 
cost of irrigation to farmers will fall as group size increases (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997). 
However  while  larger  groups  may  reduce  the  burden  of  fixed  costs  borne  by  individual 
members, increases in group size are usually accompanied by higher transaction costs (e.g. 
negotiation) and greater difficulties in observing compliance with rules. In smaller groups the 
inter-linkages between members are also likely to be stronger with greater ‘peer pressure’ for 
compliance (Aggarwal, 2000). Self-managing organisations will only be sustainable where 
free riders are punished, for instance non-payers are denied access to water or suffer other 
legal means of redress. Membership satisfaction should therefore be related to cost recovery.   7 
Other important characteristics that are conducive to effective self-organisation are 
past successful experiences with co-operation and the presence of effective leaders who are 
willing to act altruistically to create the organisation (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Meinzen-
Dick et al. 1997; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom and Gardner, 1993). The importance of local leaders 
who act as catalysts for co-operative action was recognised by Bardhan (1993). However 
there is a danger that WUAs become subject to a takeover by local elites, denying individual 
members a voice and weakening their accountability (Oorthuizen and Kloezen, 1995).  
 
Irrigation technology 
The nature of the irrigation technology  will also affect the level of costs and benefits of 
operation and maintenance. In particular, flood irrigation typically requires greater quantities 
of water, for which it is more difficult to separate the distribution of water to payers and non-
payers. In this case, effective penalties for opportunistic behaviour may be more difficult to 
implement.  It may be that WUAs are better suited to certain irrigation technologies with 
performance varying accordingly.  
 
Costs 
It is expected that farmers will value WUAs that reduce the costs of irrigation per hectare and 
which have high levels of cost recovery. Case study evidence from Mexico suggests that the 
introduction of WUAs can dramatically boost cost-recovery and thus achieve a policy goal of 
reducing dependence on the state (Kloezen, 2002). It is expected that improved cost-recovery 
will depend on both WUAs providing a superior service to farmers compared to previous 
institutional  arrangements  and  the  presence  of  effective  sanctions  against  opportunistic 
behaviour.   8 
These four sub-categories provide the basis for organising the independent variables 
included in the empirical analysis. 
 
3. Water User Associations in Macedonia  
Given  our  interest  in  investigating  the  importance  of  internal  factors  in  explaining  the 
performance of WUAs, the Bregalnica region of Macedonia is an appropriate case study. 
Bregalnica  is  a  semi-arid  region  for  which  water  scarcity  is  significant.  Rainfall  is 
approximately 500 mm per annum and occurs principally in Autumn and Spring. Due to dry, 
hot  summers,  with  temperatures  regularly  reaching  40  degrees,  water  deficits  of 
approximately 450 mm for crops typically occur (World Bank, 2006).   
The  main  crops  grown  in  the  Bregalnica  region,  as  identified  by  survey  work 
conducted  by  the  authors,  are  wheat,  maize,  barley,  alfalfa,  rice,  peppers,  tomatoes, 
watermelons and grapes. Self-reported non-irrigated wheat and grape yields are 80 and 58% 
of irrigated levels respectively. Rice, pepper, tomato and watermelon production are entirely 
reliant on irrigation. As fruit and vegetables are the main high value added crops produced, 
agricultural incomes are heavily dependent on irrigation and this is acknowledged by farmers. 
From the farm survey discussed in greater detail in section 5, 94% of respondents agreed or 
strongly  agreed  with  the  statement  that  ‘irrigation  is  very  important  for  my  livelihood’. 
Depending on topographical conditions and the type of crops, the structure of irrigation varies 
from flood irrigation for rice to, much more commonly, open channels and concrete tubes for 
arable and horticultural production.
1 
As  agricultural  fortunes  and  the  real  level  of  public  expenditure  on  rural 
infrastructure fell in the 1990s, the quality of the irrigation network deteriorated rapidly. For 
example for Macedonia as a whole the area irrigated fell from 84,879 hectares (ha) in 1990 to 
                                                 
1 The Bregalnica irrigation system includes a delivery network of 26,008 km in total length (Peshevski et al. 
2006). The system’s water is supplied by the Kalimanci Dam on the Bregalnica River.   9 
a low point of 25,343 ha in 2002 (Taseva, 2004). In the Bregalnica case, the irrigated area 
declined from 59% of total utilized agricultural area in 1990 to 26% in 1996 (World Bank, 
1997). During the 1990s, many of the concrete channels of the Bregalnica system became 
cracked and pumping stations moribund. Water can easily be stolen from such a system with 
it being common for farmers to punch holes in channels to irrigate their land without paying. 
A representative of the Kocani Public Water Authority estimated that at least 20% of irrigated 
water  was  lost  due  to  theft,  leaks  and  transpiration  from  open  channels  (Peshevski et al. 
2006).  
To improve technical and governance efficiency, at the beginning of 1998 a new 
Water Law came into effect and a project for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of irrigation 
in Republic in Macedonia commenced. The basis for this was an agreement between the 
Government of Republic of Macedonia and the World Bank. The project was valued at $32.5 
million  of  which  the  World  Bank  committed  $12.5  million,  the  Dutch  Government  $12 
million  and  the  Macedonian  Government $8  million.  The  project  covered  three  irrigation 
systems:  Tikves,  Bregalnica  and  Polog.  The  purpose  of  the  project  was  to  reconstruct 
irrigation systems, making their use sustainable through introducing better technology and 
local management. We focus on Bregalnica. 
In January 2002, a protocol for transferring irrigation management duties to Water 
User Co-operatives (WUCs) was signed. In 2003 the WUCs were renamed, according to the 
Water Users Law, as Water Communities (WC). WCs can be formed where the participants in 
a given area account for more than 50% of agricultural land in the community’s territory and 
wish to manage irrigation and drainage matters collectively. Members of a WC can be all 
subjects with the right to use agriculture land within the geographical boundaries of the WC. 
The community sets the prices of irrigated water and drainage to its members, which should   10 
reflect the true costs of delivering irrigated water, maintaining and improving the network and 
ensuring adequate drainage.  
Water communities negotiate the supply of water from a Public Water Enterprise 
(PWE) on behalf of their members. WCs are controlled by a management board, led by a 
President, and control board. The management board consists of at least five people, of whom 
the President and two others are chosen by WC members and the other two are selected by the 
Council of Local Communities. The management board makes decisions concerning the rates 
and deadlines for payment for irrigation and drainage. The control board, consisting of five 
other members, oversees the work of the management board and monitors costs on behalf of 
the community.  
Upgraded  or  reconstructed  infrastructure  used  for  irrigation/drainage,  which  is 
financed by the community, is classified as being in public ownership. Investments in new 
small-scale  irrigation/drainage  systems  by  communities  are  regulated  under  agreements 
between  the  community  and  the  Government.  At  the  time  of  the  transfer  of  irrigation 
management duties to first set of WCs (May 2002), data from the Bregalnica-Kocani PWE 
indicate that the average cost recovery rate was 36%.
2   
 
4. Data and Econometric Methodology 
Data 
Data  on  the  performance  of  the  WCs  was  collected  via  two  methods.  Firstly,  in-depth 
interviews were conducted, where possible, with the president or a senior member of the 
control  board  for  the  major  WCs  established  in  the  Bregalnica  region.  The  interviews 
collected information on the geographical area covered by the WC, membership, investment, 
main problems encountered and cost recovery. Data were collected for the first full three 
                                                 
2 Measured as the percentage of billed amounts for a given territory which was actually paid by farmers.   11 
years of the existence of each WC. Secondly, to understand the reasons for the variation in 
WC performance in greater depth and to investigate the determinants of member satisfaction, 
a farm survey was conducted. In total, 249 survey responses were collected through face to 
face interviews.  
The survey responses are divided into two groups: members of a WC (n=223) and 
farmers within the Bregalnica region who farmed within a WC area but had chosen not to join 
the association (n=26). Data collection from the latter group allows us to understand why 
some farmers have not chosen to join their respective WC. The distribution of responses by 
farm size is presented in Table 2. Estimates from senior managers of the WCs suggest, that on 
average, approximately 87% of farmers in the geographical area covered by the WCs have 
joined. This suggests that the sample is broadly representative in terms of the balance of 
members and non-members. 
Table 2 highlights that the majority of farmers who are WC members farm less than 
2 hectares. Less than 5% of farmers in this group manage more than 20 hectares and the mean 
size for this group is 5.89 hectares. Comparing these figures with those for non-members, it 
appears that the latter tend to farm smaller areas with 61.5% having less than 1 hectare. The 
mean farm size of non-members is significantly lower (2.15 hectares). Overall, the prevalence 
of farms of less than 2 ha in the sample is in line with other estimates for Macedonia as a 
whole  (World  Bank,  2006).  However  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  representativeness  of  the 
sample is impossible because the last population census for the country was conducted in 
1981 and no agricultural census has been administered since 1964. The Macedonian Ministry 
of Agriculture, Food and Water Economy estimates that there 180,000 individual farms in the 
country with an average size of 1.4 ha but this is based on an extrapolation of the data from 
1981  (World  Bank,  2006).  A  descriptive  summary  of  the  data  set  used  for  estimation  is 
presented in Appendix 1.   12 
Using  these  cross-sectional  survey  data  we  estimate,  as  a  first  step,  a  Heckman 
selection probit model to identify causal factors related to farmers’ decisions to join a water 
community. Based on these estimates we calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio to account for 
possible selection bias with respect to the estimation of the outcome equation modelled as an 
ordered probit model. Secondly, we investigate determinants of  farmers’ satisfaction with 
their membership of water communities including, beside other explanatory variables, the 
inverse Mill’s ratio from the Heckman selection model. In a third modelling step we then 
explore significant factors for changes in farmers’ water payment behaviour by estimating a 
censored least absolute deviations (CLAD) based model based on a non-parametric estimator. 
Here the estimates for water community membership satisfaction gained from our second 
model are used as an explanatory variable beside other socioeconomic characteristics. From 
this procedure we try to reveal if farmers’ satisfaction with water services can explain some of 
the  variation  in  their  payment  behaviour.  Accounting  for  possible  small  sample  bias  we 
finally bootstrap the standard errors of all our models. 
Model 1 
It is expected that a farmer’s decision to join a water community or not is influenced by a 
multitude of factors: socioeconomic characteristics at the household/farm level, production 
and  irrigation  technology  characteristics,  as  well  as  personal  attitudes  towards  and 
experiences with irrigation and water communities in general as well as with respect to their 
specific, local water community. It is likely that, in these regards, the characteristics of water 
community members will differ from non-members. Unobservable characteristics affecting 
the decision to become a member will be correlated with the unobservable characteristics 
affecting  a  farmer’s  level  of  satisfaction  with  his/her  water  community  membership. 
Selectivity  bias  would  be  present,  therefore,  if  we  were  to  draw  inferences  about  the 
determinants  of  membership  satisfaction  for  all  farmers  based  on  the  observed  level  of   13 
satisfaction of the subset which is actually a water community member. Heckman’s two-stage 
sample selection model copes with such a selection problem by assuming that the farmers 
make two judgements with regard to membership and membership satisfaction, each of which 
is determined by a different set of explanatory variables (see Heckman, 1979). 
Hence, it is based on two latent dependent variables models, where the decision to 
become a member or not is modelled as a selection equation specified as: 
1 if   0
0 otherwise
j ij k ik l il
j k l
i
hh att irr u
P
α β γ δ   + + + + >   =  
   
∑ ∑ ∑
                                               [1]                                
where  i P  is a binary variable which takes the value one if the farmer is a member of the local 
water community and zero if the farmer decided not to become a member of the local water 
community, hhdenotes the vector of socioeconomic characteristics of the household/farm, att 
stands for the personal attitudes of the farmer toward the structure and conduct of the WC, 
and  irr  for  the  irrigation  technology  related  variables.  , ,  &  α β γ δ   are  the  parameters  to 
estimate, and u is the error term (the corresponding log-likelihood function for [1] is given in 
Maddala, 1998).  
The membership satisfaction equation is given by: 
  i m im n in r ir s is
m n r s
satis hh att irr comm v µ κ τ ω ψ = + + + + + ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑                                           
  [2]                                
where satis takes the values  
{ } 1: 'very dissatisfied', 2: 'dissatisfied', 3: 'indifferent', 4: 'satisfied', 5: 'very satisfied'  
respectively,  hh  denotes  again  the  vector  of  socioeconomic  characteristics  of  the 
household/farm, att stands for the personal attitudes of the farmer toward the structure and 
conduct of the WC, irr for the irrigation technology related variables, and  comm for water   14 
community cost related characteristics.  , , ,  &  µ κ τ ω ψ  are the parameters to estimate, and v is 
the error term (the corresponding log-likelihood function for [2] is given in Maddala, 1998). 
Given the distribution of the dependent variable, we estimate [2] as an ordered probit model 
and address possible selection bias by following Heckman’s two-stage estimation procedure 
(1979). 
According to Heckman’s specification, the error terms, u and v are assumed to follow 
a bivariate normal distribution where  (0,1) v N ￿ and  ( ) E u v v ς = ; ς  is a constant and  0 ς =  
indicates that u and v are uncorrelated. If  0 ς ≠ , u and v are correlated and the following 
relationship holds: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2, 2 1 1 1 2, 2 1 1 1 2, 2 E y x y x E v x y x g v x y θ ς θ ς = + = +                                             [3]                                
where  1, 1 2, 2 , x y x y  represent the independent and dependent variables in equations [1] and [2] 
respectively. Since  2 2 2 2 2 2 ( , ) ( ) ( ) g x y E v v x x θ λ θ = > − =  where  () ()/ () λ φ ⋅ ≡ ⋅ Φ ⋅  is the inverse 
Mill’s  ratio  with  () φ ⋅ as  the  probability  density  function  and  () Φ ⋅ as  the  cumulative 
distribution function. [3] can be written equivalently as: 
( ) 1 2, 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 ( ) E y x y x x θ ς λ θ = +                                             [4]                                
The  first  stage  of  the  estimation  procedure  consists  of  estimating  equation  [1]  as  the 
membership  equation,  the  second  stage  of  the  estimation  procedure  is  the  ordered  probit 
equation of membership satisfaction which contains the inverse mills ratio as a correcting 
term. 
To address the likely problem of small sample bias as well as heteroscedasticity, we 
estimate the robust covariance matrix using the Huber-White sandwich estimator (see Huber, 
1967 and White, 1980). The latter provides consistent estimates of the covariance matrix for 
parameter  estimates  even  when  the  fitted  parametric  model  fails  to  hold  because  of   15 
misspecification or violation of the error related assumptions.
3 Puhani (2000) showed that the 
one-stage full-information ML estimation of the Heckman selection model is preferable in the 
case where collinearity problems are absent. The auxiliary regressions performed showed that 
some minor collinearity in the explanatory variables cannot be excluded. Hence, we prefer to 
apply  a  two-stage  estimation  procedure.  To  examine  the  validity  of  the  final  model 
specification, we test for the group wise insignificance of the parameters in [1] and [2] by a 
common  generalized  likelihood  ratio  testing  procedure.  Finally  a  White  (1980)  test  was 
conducted to check for possible heteroscedasticity. 
To test for small-sample bias we further investigate the robustness of our estimates 
obtained  by  [1]  and  [2]  by  applying  a  simple  stochastic  re-sampling  procedure  based  on 
bootstrapping techniques (see e.g. Efron 1979 or Efron/Tibshirani 1993). This seems to be 
necessary  as  our  cross-sectional  data  sample  consists  of  a  (rather)  limited  number  of 
observations. If we suppose that  ˆ
n Ψ  is an estimator of the parameter vector  n ψ  including all 
parameters  obtained  by  estimating  [1]  and  [2]  based  on  our  original  sample  of  176 
observations, then we are able to approximate the statistical properties of  ˆ
n Ψ  by studying a 
sample  of  C  =  1,000  bootstrap  estimators  ˆ ( ) , 1,..., n m c c C Ψ = .  These  are  obtained  by  re-
sampling our 176 observations respectively – with replacement – and re-computing  ˆ
n Ψ  by 
using each generated sample. Finally, the sampling characteristics of our vector of parameters 
are obtained from: 
(1) (1000) ˆ ˆ ˆ ,..., m m   Ψ = Ψ Ψ                                                                                              [5] 
                                                 
3 Here the estimate is calculated as the product of three matrices: the matrix formed by taking the outer product of the 
observation-level likelihood/pseudo-likelihood score vectors is used as the middle of these matrices, and this matrix is in turn 
pre- and post-multiplied by the usual model-based variance matrix (see in detail e.g. Greene, 2003). 
   16 
As discussed extensively by Horowitz (2001) and Efron and Tibshirani (1993), the bias of the 
bootstrap as an estimator of  ˆ
n Ψ ,  ˆ
n n n B ψ = Ψ −Ψ % % , is itself a feasible estimator of the bias of the 
asymptotic estimator of the true population parameter  n ψ .
4 This holds also for the standard 
deviation  of  the  bootstrapped  empirical  distribution,  providing  a  natural  estimator  of  the 
standard error for each initial parameter estimate. By using a bias corrected bootstrap we aim 
to reduce the likely small sample bias in the initial estimates. 
Model 2 
Our second model focuses on explaining the variation in farmers’ water payment behaviour. 
Among other variables, we also use the estimates from Model 1 for farmers’ satisfaction with 
their water community membership as an explanatory variable beside other socioeconomic 
household characteristics. From this procedure we try to reveal if farmers’ satisfaction with 
water services can explain some of the variation in their payment behaviour. 
Initial analyses revealed that essential model violations (heteroscedastic error terms 
and a non-normal error distribution) lead to highly inconsistent parametric estimation results 
with  respect  to  censored  model  specifications.  However,  there  are  alternative  estimation 
procedures  which  do  not  require  the  adherence  to  these  error  related  assumptions. 
Consequently, we choose as a second modelling approach a nonparametric censored least 
absolute deviations estimator (CLAD); which was developed by Powell (1984, 1986) as a 
generalization of the least absolute deviation estimation for non-negative dependent variables. 
Several  authors  (Arabmazar  and  Schmidt,  1981;  Vijverberg,  1987;  Rogers,  1993)  have 
demonstrated that the CLAD estimator is robust to heteroscedasticity and is consistent and 
asymptotically normal for a wide class of error distributions. The CLAD estimator is more 
robust to outliers, which often arise frequently in the case of survey data. 
                                                 
4 Hence the bias-corrected estimator of 
n ψ  can be computed by  ˆ ˆ 2 n B ψ ψ ψ ψ − = − % % .   17 
Farmers’ payment behaviour with respect to their water bill can be approximated by 
the following equation: 
β ε = + max( , ) i i i payincr x L                                                                                         [6] 
where payincr denotes the percentage change in the amount of their total water bill paid by 
the farmer in the study period from 2002 to 2004, xi as a vector of the observable explanatory 
variables for farm i (i.e. socioeconomic characteristics of the household/farm, the personal 
attitudes of the farmer, the irrigation technology related variables, and water community cost 
related characteristics), β  are the parameters to estimate, and ε  is the error term. L stands for 
the lower censoring bound with respect to the dependent variable. The CLAD estimator of  β  
minimizes the sum of absolute deviations,  ε , assuming a conditional median restriction on 
the error term. The objective function can thus be specified as: 
{ } β β
=
 








S payincr L x
n
                                                              [7] 
whereby the estimator uses the observations so that the median is preserved by monotonic 
functions. Hence, the CLAD estimator involves the minimization of an objective function that 
is not necessarily convex in β . Thus, obtaining a global minimum of [7] implies the usage of 
numerical minimization algorithms based on the approximations of the first derivative.
5 The 
optimization procedure follows Jonston and DiNardo (1997) and comprises of three steps: (i) 
estimating the median regression using the total sample to determine the initial values for  β , 
(ii) calculation of the values for the dependent variable  i payincr
 
based on the estimated 
values for  β  by neglecting the observations for which  i payincr  takes a negative value, and 
(iii) estimating the median regression based on the adjusted sample to obtain new estimates 
for  β . Steps (ii) and (iii) form the iteration process to determine the final values for  β . A 
                                                 
5 The iterative linear programming algorithm (ILPA) contained in STATA was utilised.   18 
crucial weakness of the CLAD estimator is its finite sample bias resulting in mean-biased 
results for relatively small samples (see Paarsch, 1984). 
A generalized likelihood ratio testing procedure was again applied to examine the 
validity of the final model specification with respect to the group wise insignificance of the 
parameters in [7]. A White test was conducted to check for possible heteroscedasticity. Since 
finally the estimator’s asymptotic variance-covariance matrix involves the estimation of the 
density function of the error term, we use again bootstrap estimates of the standard errors with 
about 1,000 draws following the re-sampling procedure outlined above for Model 1. 
5 - Results and Discussion 
Before  reviewing  the  econometric  models,  it  is  informative  to  present  key  descriptive 
statistics.  As  part  of  the  farm  survey  respondents  were  asked  to  rate  their  degree  of 
satisfaction with their WC, on a five point Likert scale where 1 equals ‘very dissatisfied’ and 
5 equals ‘very satisfied’. The results are presented in Figure 1. Figure 1 indicates that only 
2.5% were ‘very dissatisfied’ with the majority being either ‘indifferent’ or ‘satisfied’. Only 
3.8% were ‘very satisfied’. By this measure, therefore, the introduction of WCs has been 
neither an unqualified success nor resounding failure. Regarding cost recovery, results are 
more positive. For the first two years following formation of the WCs average cost recovery 
rates,  measured  as  the  percentage  of  billed  amounts  actually  paid,  were  72  and  70.6% 
respectively. This compares favourably to the comparable figure of 36% prior to formation. 
However, significant non-payment persists. 
The data presented in Figure 1 however mask significant differences between WCs, 
which are reported for the six most numerous WCs included in the sample in Figure 2. In 
Figure 2 mean satisfaction scores are presented, based on the five point Likert scale where 1 
equals ‘very dissatisfied’ and 5 equals ‘very satisfied’. Overall farmers in Trkanje register the 
highest  mean  level  of  satisfaction  (3.75)  with  the  lowest  scores  for  Istibanja  (2.89)  and   19 
Vidovište (2.93). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicates the differences between the six 
WCs are significant at the 5% level (F test = 2.87). 
The  descriptive  statistics  indicate  that  even  with  a  common  external  framework 
significant variations in the performance of WCs are evident, suggesting the importance of 
variations in internal characteristics for explaining variations in satisfaction. These factors are 
explored in the econometric models. 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 summarize the results for the estimated models. According to the 
different  diagnosis  tests  performed  all  estimated  model  specifications  show  a  statistical 
significance at a satisfactory level and no severe signs of misspecification (see different model 
quality  measures).  These  conclusions  are  backed  up  by  the  bootstrapped  bias-corrected 
standard errors as well as the robust estimation technique applied for the Heckman selection 
specification which confirms the robustness of the various estimates.  
The linear hypotheses tests conducted with respect to the significance of explanatory 
variables  indicate  for  Model  1  (binary  probit  and  ordered  probit)  the  relevance  of 
socioeconomic characteristics, farmers’ attitudes towards their water community’s structure 
and conduct, utilised irrigation technology, and for Model 2 (non-parametric least-absolute 
deviations estimation), in addition, water community cost related characteristics. Considering 
the specific variables included in Model 1, it is apparent regarding the impact of household 
characteristics  on  propensity  to  join  a  WC,  only  size  of  farm  is  significant  (Table  3). 
Membership is not biased to a particular demographic group or related to years in education. 
This suggests that WCs have not been captured by certain elites, at least in terms of the 
membership  base,  albeit  larger  farmers  are  more  likely  to  become  members.  Farmers’ 
attitudes regarding the structure and conduct of their WC were measured via 5 point Likert 
scales, ranging from 1 ‘strongly disagree’ to 5 ‘strongly agree’. Scale items were designed to 
measure farmers’ trust in the WC and its senior managers, drawing on verified scale items   20 
developed by Doney and Cannon (1997). The Likert scale questions also captured the level of 
farmers’ previous experience with local associations, degree of free riding, effective sanctions 
for opportunistic behaviour and commitment to the WC. The majority of these scale items are 
significant;  propensity  to  join  a  WC  is  positively  related  to  the  WC  having  transparent 
resource use, clear geographical area, trust in the management board, effective systems of 
payment and transparent management structure. Good governance and accountability are thus 
vital  to  encouraging  farmers  to  become  members.  Propensity  to  join  a  WC  is  negatively 
related to previous involvement with local associations, which reflects past problems and how 
‘association’ is often perceived as being linked to the farm structures of the socialist era. 
Considering irrigation technology, farmers for whom a higher proportion of their total farm is 
irrigated and those using flooding technology (for rice) are more likely to join a WC. This 
suggests that commitment to WCs is higher where irrigation is more critical to the farm, as 
expected by Marshall (2004). 
Table  4  presents  the  second  stage  of  the  Heckman  Selection  model  concerning 
farmers’ satisfaction with their membership. Empirical evidence suggests that membership 
satisfaction is related to household characteristics, the WC’s conduct and performance and the 
technology  employed in the case of flood irrigation. Regarding household characteristics, 
satisfaction is positively related to size of farm and level of education. Regarding the latter, 
fieldworkers who collected data perceived that better educated people more readily perceived 
the potential benefits of WC membership and, more importantly, were aware that benefits 
would accrue over time. Less educated respondents expected all the benefits to be immediate 
and were impatient for an improvement in their fortunes. 
Significant, negative  correlations between satisfaction and  age, and proportion of 
household income derived from crops are evident. The latter may reflect that those who are 
more dependent on crops have higher requirements and demands for the WC. This may also   21 
explain  the  significant,  negative  coefficient  for  “irrigation  is  very  important  for  my 
livelihood”. Regarding other Likert scale items, members’ satisfaction is positively related to 
trust  in  both  the  leader  and  management  board  of  the  WC,  presence  of  a  transparent 
management structure and structure for conflict solution. These relationships again highlight 
the importance of good governance much of which rests with trust of the senior managers of 
each  WC.  For  instance,  the  satisfaction  of  members  in  one  WC  plummeted  after  the 
community’s President  damaged an irrigation channel and refused to pay  for repairs.   In 
another case, members withheld payments after they learnt that their President had not paid 
his own water bill. 
The only significant relationship identified between irrigation type and members’ 
satisfaction is a negative one for flood technology. Implementing effective sanctions to punish 
non-payers is more difficult in the case of flood irrigation in Macedonia as water typically 
flows freely between the plots of paying and non-paying farmers. Cutting supplies of water to 
non-payers  would  negatively  impact  on  farmers  who  have  paid  their  bills.  This  is  also 
reflected  in  the  positive  correlation  between  cost  recovery  of  the  WC  and  membership 
satisfaction. Flood irrigation, because it demands greater quantities of water, is also more 
costly per hectare. A positive correlation is apparent between membership satisfaction and 
increases in a farmer’s water bills between the years 2002 and 2004. The latter variable can be 
considered a proxy for a growth in the size of land under WC irrigation. Individuals who are 
expanding their irrigated activities are thus more satisfied, suggesting that structural change is 
likely to help reinforce the WCs. Those farmers who are seeking to grow are more likely to be 
younger and better educated. Finally regarding membership satisfaction, the inverse mill’s 
ratio is significant. 
The  results  of  Model  2,  concerning  relationships  with  the  changes  in  farmers’ 
payment behaviour, are presented in Table 5. This analysis is critical to assessing the viability   22 
of  WCs,  given  historically  very  low  levels  of  cost  recovery  and  the  objective  of  WCs 
becoming  financially sustainable local institutions. Significant relationships are uncovered 
between  household  characteristics,  farmers’  attitudes,  WC  characteristics  and  payment 
behaviour.  Improvements  in  payment  behaviour  (measured  in  terms  of  the  proportional 
change over the years 2002 to 2004 in the amount billed for water actually paid by the farmer) 
are associated with a higher dependence on crops. Those less dependent on irrigation have 
been less responsive to the WCs in terms of improving their payment behaviour and this may 
reflect that the sanction of withholding water is less severe to those not engaged in crop 
production.  Improvements  in  payment  behaviour  are  positively  related  to  members’ 
satisfaction (2
nd stage of Model 1) and the presence of effective sanctions for non-paying 
farmers. Improvements in payment behaviour thus depend on the presence of both a carrot 
(better service delivering higher satisfaction) and stick against opportunistic behaviour.  
A positive correlation is apparent for relationship between the expansion of irrigated 
farm area, proxied by the variable ‘increase in water bill 2002 to 2004’ and improvements in 
payment  behaviour.  This  again  suggests  that  structural  change  is  broadly  positive  for 
establishing  sustainable  WCs.  The  coefficient  for  costs  per  hectare  of  land  irrigated  is 
significant  and  negative,  indicating  that  lower  fees  are  associated  with  improvements  in 
payment behaviour. Older farmers have been significantly less responsive.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The performance of WCs as a form of self managing organisation for managing irrigation 
systems in Macedonia has been investigated drawing on extensive primary survey data. By 
focusing on the WCs created under a common legislative framework and operating within a 
common market for crops, it has been possible to evaluate the importance of socio-economic 
characteristics, structure and conduct of WCs, irrigation technology and costs in explaining   23 
farmers’  decision  to  join  a  WC  and  variations  in  membership  satisfaction  and  payment 
behaviour. Overall the analysis indicates that more optimistic inferences are warranted than 
Theesfeld (2004; p.268-269), who, based on her analysis of irrigation systems, concluded for 
Bulgaria that ‘it remains questionable whether measures that facilitate local self-governance 
can  be  successful….The  general  attitude  toward  collective  action  is  pessimistic’.  In 
neighbouring Macedonia, by contrast, the majority of farmers in project areas have joined a 
WC, less than 20% are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their WC and the water 
reform has stimulated a significant increase in cost recovery rates. However farmers vary 
considerably in their degree of satisfaction and payment behaviour, which has been explored 
in the econometric analysis. 
Regarding  socio-economic  characteristics,  farmers  with  smaller  farms  are 
significantly less likely to join a WC and, if they do become a member, be less satisfied. This 
is not because they are directly discriminated against but rather those with larger cropping 
areas and greater dependence on irrigation are more committed to the WCs. The payment 
behaviour of farmers with a greater dependence on irrigation and who are expanding their 
farms has also been better. Anecdotal evidence for Macedonia suggests that structural change 
in farming is similar to that in other parts of CEE: consolidation is occurring, with older, less 
educated farmers and those with smaller land areas more likely to exit the sector. As older, 
less educated farmers and those with smaller farms are less satisfied with the WCs, and older 
farmers have poorer payment behaviour, structural change is likely to be conducive to the 
establishment of WCs.  
However, structural change alone will not guarantee the success of WCs; the internal 
structure and conduct of the WC, is also highly significant. In particular, the presence of good 
governance  and  accountability  contribute  to  the  decision  to  join  a  WC,  membership 
satisfaction and changes in payment rates. Analysis reveals that good governance requires   24 
effective leadership, transparency in resource allocation and trust in senior managers. While 
the constitutions of each WC can detail responsibilities and procedures to help maximise 
transparency and promote accountability much will rest on local factors.  Outcomes cannot be 
fully  controlled  by  policymakers  and  the  importance  of  trusted,  community  minded 
individuals at the local level cannot be discounted. In acknowledging this, the proponents of 
irrigation management transfer cannot guarantee that sustainable WUAs will always emerge – 
much depends on local social capital, which varies spatially and temporally. The Macedonian 
case  highlights  how  good  governance  and  accountability  are  not  uniform  even  within  a 
common legal framework, and dissatisfaction with WCs, where present, has stemmed from 
both a lack of trust in senior management and an inability to exclude non-payers. While trust 
is identified as being significant, it cannot be instantly created or transferred. 
Cost recovery has improved dramatically since the introduction of the WCs. Model 2 
reveals  that  improved  payment  behaviour  depends  on,  amongst  other  variables,  both  the 
positive satisfaction of members and effective sanctions against non-payers. Previous studies 
have rarely paid attention to membership satisfaction, yet our analysis indicates that it is a 
critical determinant of payment behaviour and hence the long-run viability of WUAs. WUAs 
are unlikely to work where the service to farmers is poor and unreliable. In assessing whether 
WUAs  can  be  usefully  introduced,  policy  makers  therefore  have  to  consider  if  they  can 
deliver  both  the  carrot  of  a  reliable  service  and  stick  of  sanctions  against  opportunistic 
behaviour. While this is often treated as an ideological debate concerning the merits of state 
versus alternative management regimes, with a consequent focus on the external environment 
(respect for private property rights, markets etc.) in shaping outcomes, our analysis reveals 
that local, internal factors are significant in determining the actual size of carrots and sticks 
faced by farmers. Consequently, even if WUAs have been successfully introduced in one   25 
location, it does not follow that the same rules and procedures transferred to another location 
will generate comparable results. 
Finally, in the Macedonian case, satisfaction is also significantly lower where flood 
irrigation is employed, for which the costs are higher and depriving non-payers of water is 
more  difficult.  This  suggests  that  the  success  of  WCs  also  depends  on  the  nature  of  the 
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Sub-category  Specific variables / proxies 
External environment    Legal rights to organise and negotiate, property 
rights, markets for crops  
 
Internal factors  Socio-economic 
characteristics 
Water scarcity and impact of irrigation on 
incomes, farm size, age and education of farmer 
 
  Structure and conduct of 
the WUA 
Number of members, past experience of co-
operation, effective leadership, sanctions against 
opportunistic behaviour 
 
  Irrigation Technology 
 
Type of irrigation (flood, sprinkler etc.) 
  Cost related factors 
 
Irrigation costs per hectare, cost recovery of 
WUA 
 





Table 2: Classification of Members and Non-Members of WCs by farm size (%) 
 






Less than 1 ha   37.2  61.5  26.5 
1 to 1.99 ha  26.0  7.7  22.5 
2 to 2.99 ha  9.9  3.8  15.3 
3 to 3.99 ha  5.4  7.7  9.6 
4 to 4.99 ha  4.9  3.8  5.2 
5 to 9.9 ha   6.3  11.5  11.2 
10 to 19.99  5.4  3.8  5.2 
20 ha+  4.9  0.0  4.4 
Source: survey data 
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Table 3: Robust Two-Stage Heckman Selection Model – Bootstrapped Binary Probit Estimates 
 










stage 1 – selection equation  dependent 1: water community membership 
Socio-economic  characteristics 
Hectares farmed  0.467**  2.17  [0.210; 0.221] 
Proportion of land used for crops  -0.042  -0.62  [0.066; 0.069] 
Proportion of household income derived from farming  -0.017  0.48  [-0.035; -0.036] 
Proportion of household income derived from crops  -0.001  0.956  [-0.001; -0.001] 
Age of farmer  0.204  0.620  [0.321; 0.337] 
Level of education  -0.158  0.701  [-0.220; -0.231] 
Farmers attitudes towards water community’s  structure and conduct 
Water communities improve the quality of irrigation  -0.011  0.986  [-0.011; -0.011] 
WC guarantees transparent resource use  1.199***  2.54  [0.460; 0.484] 
WC covers a clear geographical area  1.201***  2.72  [0.431; 0.453] 
Irrigation is very important for livelihood  0.266  0.43  [0.603; 0.634] 
Farmers have common view on irrigation management  -0.768***  -2.59  [0.289; 0.304] 
Farmers maintain irrigation equipment for long-run use  -0.686*  -1.63  [0.410; 0.431] 
Farmers consider only their short-term interest  0.067***  2.70  [0.024; 0.025] 
Want to have a say in how irrigated water is delivered  1.515***  3.39  [0.436; 0.458] 
Want to have a say in how irrigation equipment is maintained  -0.144  -0.29  [0.484; 0.509] 
Trust in the leader of the WC  0.059  0.14  [0.411; 0.432] 
Trust in the management board of the WC  1.679***  3.79  [0.432; 0.454] 
Experience with involvement in local associations  -1.739***  -3.72  [0.456; 0.479] 
Transparent management structure  1.037***  2.89  [0.350; 0.368] 
Transparent relations between WC and water authority  -0.012  -0.02  [0.585; 0.615] 
Easy to cut access to non-payers  0.779***  3.28  [0.232; 0.243] 
Use of irrigated water can be effectively monitored  -0.632**  -2.16  [0.285; 0.300] 
Transparent structure for conflict solution  0.343  1.11  [0.301; 0.317] 
Irrigation technology related characteristics 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated  2.131***  3.05  [0.681; 0.716] 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated by sprinkler technology  1.276  1.37  [0.908; 0.955] 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated by flooding technology  1.696***  2.61  [0.634; 0.666] 
constant  -0.654  -0.08  [7.971; 8.379] 
log pseudo-LL  -19.114 
Wald test of model significance, chi
2(26)  91.00*** 
McFadden’s R2  0.671 
McKelvey/Zavoina’s R
2  0.899 
Cragg & Uhler’s R2  0.741 
Count R2 (adj Count R2)  0.955 (0.556) 
linear hypotheses tests on model specification (chi
2(x)) 
 H0: socio-economic characteristics related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(6))  
 H0: farmer’s attitudes/experiences related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(17)) 









  1: * - 10%-, ** - 5%-, *** - 1%-level of significance; 2: 1000 replications. 
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Table 4: Robust Two-Stage Heckman Selection Model – Bootstrapped Ordered Probit Estimates 
 










stage 2 – outcome equation  dependent 2: farmer’s satisfaction with water 
community membership 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Hectares farmed  0.946**  2.15  [0.113; 0.120] 
Proportion of land used for crops  -0.003  -0.19  [0.013; 0.021] 
Proportion of household income derived from farming  -0.001  -0.15  [0.011; 0.009] 
Proportion of household income derived from crops  -0.013***  -2.70  [0.005; 0.006] 
Age of farmer  -0.273**  -2.04  [0.129; 0.130] 
Level of education  0.360***  2.79  [0.124; 0.128] 
Farmers’ attitudes towards water community’s  structure and conduct 
WC guarantees transparent resource use  0.019  0.11  [0.164; 0.178] 
Irrigation is very important for livelihood  -0.489***  -3.16  [0.183; 0.223] 
Want to have a say in how irrigated water is delivered  -0.249  -1.09  [0.218; 0.221] 
Want to have a say in how irrigation equipment is maintained  0.091  0.51  [0.169; 0.174] 
Trust in the leader of the WC  0.478***  2.71  [0.171; 0.175] 
Trust in the management board of the WC  1.089***  5.07  [0.207; 0.208] 
Experience with involvement in local associations  0.363***  2.09  [0.159; 0.167] 
Transparent management structure  0.885***  4.49  [0.181; 0.182] 
Transparent relations between WC and water authority  0.118  0.65  [0.159; 0.164] 
Transparent structure for conflict solution  0.269***  11.24  [0.216; 0.236] 
Irrigation technology related characteristics 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated  -0.165  -0.43  [0.399; 0.413] 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated by furrow technology  0.123  0.27  [0.376; 0.446] 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated by sprinkler technology  0.059  0.18  [0.313; 0.322] 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated by flooding technology  -0.828***  -2.27  [0.429; 0.448] 
Water community cost related characteristics 
Cost recovery  0.297***  11.17  [0.023; 0.027] 
Costs per hectare of land irrigated  0.002***  2.15  [7.88e-05; 8.78e-05] 
Increase in water bill 2002 to 2004  0.001***  2.08  [5.46E-05; 6.91E-05] 
inverse mill’s ratio  -2.123***  -2.51  [0.698; 0.881] 
log pseudo-LL  -97.911 
Wald test of model significance, chi
2(24)  96.78*** 
McFadden’s R2  0.620 
McKelvey/Zavoina’s R
2  0.537 
Cragg & Uhler’s R2  0.503 
Count R2 (adj Count R2)  0.946 (0.640) 
linear hypotheses tests on model specification (chi
2(x)) 
 H0: socio-economic characteristic related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(6))  
 H0: farmer’s attitudes/experiences related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(9)) 
 H0: irrigation technology related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(4)) 









  1: * - 10%-, ** - 5%-, *** - 1%-level of significance; 2: 1000 replications. 
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Table 5: Non-Parametric Cumulative Least Absolute Deviation Model – Bootstrapped Estimates 
 









dependent: proportional change in farms’ water bill payment 2002 - 2004 
independents 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Hectares farmed  -0.908  -0.94  [0.942; 0.990] 
Proportion of land used for crops  0.437***  5.44  [0.078; 0.082] 
Proportion of household income derived from farming  -0.447***  -8.28  [0.053; 0.055] 
Proportion of household income derived from crops  0.433***  9.55  [0.044; 0.046] 
Age of farmer  -0.608***  -0.56  [1.059; 1.113] 
Level of education  0.938  0.88  [1.039; 1.093] 
Farmers attitudes towards water community’s  structure and conduct 
Farmer’s satisfaction with water community membership (y_hat model 2)  3.571***  3.25  [1.098; 1.071] 
Easy to  cut access to non-payers  4.147**  2.02  [2.053; 2.002] 
Water community cost related characteristics 
Membership  -3.908  -0.85  [4.597; 4.483] 
Costs per hectare of land irrigated  -0.003***  -6.02  [4.98E-04; 4.86E-04] 
Increase in water bill 2002 to 2004  0.004***  13.71  [2.92E-04; 2.84E-04] 
Irrigation technology related characteristics 
proportion of total farm area irrigated  -2.776  -0.78  [3.559; 3.470] 
constant   -17.411  -1.44  [12.091; 11.789] 
minimum sum of deviations  2966.997 
Adj. McFadden’s R2  0.878 
linear hypotheses tests on model specification (chi
2(x)) 
 H0: socio-economic characteristics related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(6))  
 H0: farmer’s attitudes/experiences related variables have no significant effect (chi
2(3)) 
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Source: survey data 
 
 







































Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean  StDev  Min  Max 
Hectares farmed (in ha)  5.610      20.628                 0    290 
Proportion of land used for crops (in %)  98.407      6.429               30    100 
Proportion of household income derived from farming (in %)  67.109  24.406           10  100 
Proportion of household income derived from crops (in %)  62.768      27.803                   8  100 
Level of education (in years of schooling)  3.929      1.048                   1  6 
Water communities improve the quality of irrigation 
(1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-neither agree nor disagree, 4-agree, 5-
strongly agree) 
4.048      0.740            1  5 
WC guarantees transparent resource use (1-5 as above)  3.638      0.958            1  5 
WC covers a clear geographical area (1-5 as above)  3.956      0.904            1  5 
Irrigation is very important for livelihood (1-5 as above)  4.550      0.797            1  5 
Farmers have common view on irrigation management (1-5 as above)  3.546      1.003            1  5 
Farmers maintain irrigation equipment for long-run use 
(1-5 as above) 
3.876      1.014            1  5 
Farmers consider only their short-term interest (1-5 as above)  2.988      1.186            1  5 
Want to have a say in how irrigated water is delivered (1-5 as above)  3.550      0.915            1  5 
Want to have a say in how irrigation equipment is maintained 
(1-5 as above) 
3.502    0.983            1  5 
Trust in the leader of the WC (1-5 as above)  3.193      1.208            1  5 
Trust in the management board of the WC (1-5 as above)  3.277      1.051            1  5 
Experience with involvement in local associations (1-5 as above)  3.141      1.147            1  5 
Transparent management structure (1-5 as above)  3.402      1.043            1  5 
Transparent relations between WC and water authority (1-5 as above)  3.209      0.969            1  5 
Easy to cut access to non-payers (1-5 as above)  3.502       1.089            1  5 
Use of irrigated water can be effectively monitored (1-5 as above)  3.353      1.022            1  5 
Transparent structure for conflict solution (1-5 as above)  3.496      0.844            1  5 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated (in %)  0.473      0.340            0  1 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated by sprinkler technology (in %)  0.306      0.462            0  1 
Proportion of total farm area irrigated by flooding technology (in %)  0.478      0.501            0  1 
Cost recovery (in %)  79.103     8.690                   60  90 
Costs per hectare of land irrigated (in DEN/ha)  3238.672     2385.482           0  17000 
Increase in water bill 2002 to 2004 (in %)  -596.757      14677.5      -136000  99000 
Membership (1-member, 0-non member)  0.896      0.306            0  1 
Farmer’s satisfaction with water community membership 
(1-very dissatisfied, 2-dissatisfied, 3-indifferent, 4-satisfied, 5-very satisfied) 
3.419      0.902            1  5 
Proportional change in farms’ water bill payment 2002 - 2004 (in %)  -7.217      39.386         -100  100 
 
 
 